DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

 THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986 . NARVASA, J.

 

Topic: Classification of Corporation as to the Number of members, Corporation Sole

Principle: The 1973 Constitution cannot impair vested rights. Thus where land was acquired in 1962 when corporations were allowed to acquire lands not beyond 1,024 hectares, the same may be registered in 1982 although under 1973 Constitution corporations cannot acquire lands of the public domain.

A corporation that acquired private land in 1962may have it registered in 1982 despite the prohibition in the 1973Constitution which cannot be given retroactive effect as to impair vested rights.

NATURE: appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decisionof the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.

 

FACTS: The land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,Inc., on October 29,1962 (thus according to the lower court, the applicable phil. Constitution is the 1935), from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities. the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel. The land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;   

 

The Director of Lands asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels),it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme.

 

ISSUE: Whether the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000hectares.

 

HELD: YEs. Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acme's right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

 

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered,only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.

 

There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades,whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.